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Abstract
Knowledge, belief, and evidence are fundamental notions which appear in a wide range of areas. Over the
last decade epistemic reasoning with justiﬁcations has broadened even more the scope of applications of
epistemic logic as agents gained the ability to not only reason about epistemic states of knowledge and
belief of agents, but also to track their justiﬁcations and to sort those which are pertinent to given facts
and suﬃcient for epistemic conclusions.
This paper extends realization algorithm for S4-to-LP case to S4Jn-to-S4nLP case. It converts cut-free deriva-
tions in S4Jn into derivations in the corresponding Justiﬁcation Logic S4nLP where witnesses of knowledge,
the justiﬁcation terms, are recovered for all instances of justiﬁed common knowledge. The algorithm was
implemented in the MetaPRL framework and was tested on several well-known epistemic puzzles, such as
Muddy Children, Surprise Examination Paradox, etc.
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Introduction
The study of epistemic reasoning, reasoning about knowledge and belief, is one
of the core areas of Computer Science and Artiﬁcial Intelligence. The traditional
systems of formal epistemology are based on modal logics and have been the sub-
jects of intense research activity during the past decades [10; 15]. There are several
computer-aided systems of modal and epistemic reasoning available (for an incom-
plete list, see [17]).
A foundational eﬀort in this area has enriched modal epistemic logic with the
internalized notion of justiﬁcation, which became part of the language of epistemic
logic. This development substantially broadens the scope of applications of epis-
temic logic. We now have the capability to not only reason about epistemic states
of knowledge and belief of agents, but also to track their justiﬁcations and to sort
those which are pertinent to given facts and suﬃcient for epistemic conclusions.
The very notion of evidence has become the subject of rigorous studies.
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The Artemov’s Realization Theorem [2; 3] is the fundamental result that reveals
the robust evidence system behind traditional epistemic modal logic reasoning. It
recovers evidence terms for each occurrence of epistemic modality in a given the-
orem. We started with the implementation of improved Artemov’s Realization
Theorem within the framework of the MetaPRL computer-aided reasoning system,
then proceeded with test runs on a wide range of well-known epistemic problems.
1 Translation of S4Jn cut-free proofs into S4nLP proof
1.1 Overview of S4nLP logic
S4nLP [4] is a multi-agent logic of evidence-based knowledge, with knowledge op-
erators of n agents K1,K2,K3, . . . ,Kn, acting as S4 modalities [10], and evidence
assertions of the form t : A, where t is an evidence term and A is a formula, as in
LP [3]. Evidence term t is built from constants a, b, c, . . . and variables x, y, z, . . .
with the help of binary operators ‘·’ (application), ‘+’ (union), and unary operator
‘!’ (inspection).
Formulas of S4nLP are deﬁned by the following grammar:
⊥ | S | A → B | A ∧B | A ∨B | ¬A | KiA | t : A, where t is an evidence and S is
a sentence variable.
Evidence operation has highest precedence and all other connectives have stan-
dard precedence order.
Hilbert-style axioms and rules of S4nLP contain classical propositional logic ax-
ioms with the Modus Ponens rule along with
Knowledge principles
B1i. Ki(A → B) → (KiA → KiB)
B2i. KiA → A
B3i. KiA → KiKiA (positive introspection)
R2i. A  KiA (knowledge generalization)
for each individual knowledge operator Ki.
Evidence Principles
E1. s : (A → B) → (t : A → (s · t) : B) (application)
E2. t : A →!t : (t : A) (inspection)
E3. s : A → (s+ t) : A, t : A → (s+ t) : A (union)
E4. t : A → A (reﬂexivity)
R3.  c : A, where A is an S4nLP axiom and c is a proof constant (evidence for
axioms).
Principle connecting evidence and knowledge
C1. t : A → KiA (undeniability of evidence).
All axioms are schemas in the language of S4nLP. Rules are applied across all
sections. The system is closed under substitutions of evidence terms for evidence
variables and formulas for propositional variables. Deduction theorem Γ, A  B ⇒
Γ  A → B holds, where Γ is a ﬁnite set of S4nLP formulas.
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The following two lemmas will be used in the proof of realization algorithm
presented later in the text:
Lemma 1.1 (Lifting Lemma) [3; 4] If A1, . . . , An, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm  F ,
then for some evidence term t = t(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym),
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm  t(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) : F.
Lemma 1.2 [5] For any proof variables xi and any formulas Bi, there exists a
proof term s = s(x1, . . . , xn) such that
LP  x1 : B1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn : Bn → s(x1, . . . , xn) : (x1 : B1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn : Bn).
1.2 Overview of S4Jn system
S4Jn [4; 5] is a forgetful evidence-based logic with n + 1 modalities K1, . . . ,Kn, J .
JA reads as ‘A is justiﬁed’ and is a forgetful projection of evidence assertion t : A.
The dummy n + 1th agent corresponding to J plays the role of a skeptical and
not logically omniscient S4-agent who accepts facts only if they are supplied with
checkable evidence. This agent is trusted by all other agents and is capable of
internalizing and inspecting any fact actually proven in the system.
The forgetful version of undeniability of evidence principle for S4Jn is JA → KiA,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Below we present a Gentzen-style formulation [18] of S4Jn called S4
J
nG.
A sequent is a pair of ﬁnite sets of S4Jn formulas presented as Γ ⇒ Δ. Axioms
of Gentzen-style S4Jn are the sequents S,Γ ⇒ Δ, S and ⊥,Γ ⇒ Δ, where S is a
propositional variable.
S4Jn is strictly weaker than system S4
C
n [1], where common knowledge C is deﬁned
using traditional ﬁxpoint common knowledge [10]. Nevertheless, S4Jn seems suﬃcient
for all practical applications. At the same time, S4Jn axiomatics allows standard
methods of proof theory, and allows to draw parallels with logic of explicit proofs
LP.
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Gentzen style rules of S4Jn:
Γ ⇒ Δ, A
¬A,Γ ⇒ Δ (¬ ⇒)
A,Γ ⇒ Δ
Γ ⇒ Δ,¬A (⇒ ¬)
A,B,Γ ⇒ Δ
A ∧B,Γ ⇒ Δ (∧ ⇒)
Γ ⇒ Δ, A Γ ⇒ Δ, B
Γ ⇒ Δ, A ∧B (⇒ ∧)
A,Γ ⇒ Δ B,Γ ⇒ Δ
A ∨B,Γ ⇒ Δ (∨ ⇒)
Γ ⇒ Δ, A,B
Γ ⇒ Δ, A ∨B (⇒ ∨)
Γ ⇒ Δ, A B,Γ ⇒ A
A → B,Γ ⇒ Δ (→⇒)
A,Γ ⇒ Δ, B
Γ ⇒ Δ, A → B (⇒→)
and n+ 1 pairs of modal rules:
A,A,Γ ⇒ Δ
A,Γ ⇒ Δ (⇒)
JΓ,Δ ⇒ A
JΓ,Δ,Π ⇒ Σ,A (⇒ )
where  ∈ {K1, . . . ,Kn, J} and {A1, . . . , Am} = {A1, . . . ,Am}.
1.3 Main Deﬁnitions and Facts for the Realization Procedure
The goal of this work was to replace justiﬁable knowledge J with explicit justiﬁca-
tions, i.e. proof polynomials (proof terms). In other words, instead of knowing that
something is ‘justiﬁed,’ we would like to have its actual justiﬁcation. An algorithm
that accomplishes this is called realization procedure.
Deﬁnition 1.3 To realize a modal formula F from S4Jn in S4nLP means to substi-
tute proof polynomials for all occurrences of J in F .
Deﬁnition 1.4 A realization r is called normal if all negative occurrences of J are
realized by proof variables.
Realization theorem.
The ﬁrst version of the realization theorem for S4 and LP, producing a Hilbert-
style derivation, was established in [2]. Another version of the realization theorem,
producing a Gentzen-style derivation, was presented in [3]. In both versions the
produced evidence terms could be exponential in the length of a given cut-free proof
of the theorem. A modiﬁed algorithm in [5] lowers the bound of produced evidence
terms’ length to quadratic in the size of a given cut-free proof of an epistemic modal
theorem.
In this work, we extend realization algorithm from [5] to S4Jn and S4nLP, imple-
ment it, and test its performance on a number of paradigmatic epistemic problems.
These tests show robust behavior of realization terms in which complexity stays
ﬁrmly within theoretically predicted polynomial (quadratic) bounds.
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1.4 Realization Algorithm
The realization procedure works by induction on the depth of the S4Jn derivation
tree. It runs through the Gentzen-style proof of a formula F in S4Jn and simul-
taneously constructs a realization and Hilbert-style proof of the realized formula.
We also keep track of all instances of the evidence for axiom rule R3 used in this
Hilbert-style proof, i.e., of constant speciﬁcation.
We start with deﬁnitions of positive and negative occurrences of modality J in
a formula and in a sequent, as adapted from [2]:
• An outer occurrence of J in JF is positive;
• A corresponding occurrence of J in F and G → F , G∨F , G∧F , JF , and Γ ⇒ Δ, F
has the same polarity;
• Corresponding occurrences of J in F and ¬F , F → G, and F,Γ ⇒ Δ have
opposite polarities.
In a cut-free derivation, the rules respect polarities. Occurrences of J introduced
by (⇒ J) are positive:
JΓ ⇒ A
JΓ,Π ⇒ Σ,JA (⇒ J).
All occurrences of J-modality in a given derivation tree of ⇒ F are divided into
families of related occurrences. Each occurrence of J in a side formula G (i.e., from
Γ and Δ) in the premise of the rule is related only to the corresponding occurrence
of J in G in the conclusion of the rule. Similarly, each occurrence of J in an active
formula of the rule, i.e., in a formula in the premise that is transformed by the
rule, is related only to the corresponding occurrence of J in the principal formula
of the rule, i.e. in the result of transformation. For example, in the (J ⇒)-rule,
formulas A and JA in the premise sequent are the active formulas, and formula JA
in the conclusion sequent is the principal formula. This relationship is extended by
reﬂexivity and transitivity. Therefore all related occurrences are naturally split into
families of related occurrences.
Since rules in the cut-free Gentzen system respect polarities, each family consists
of J’s of the same polarity. We call a family positive if it consists of positive J’s, and
negative if it consists of negative J’s.
J modalities from the same family correspond to the same occurrence of J in the
proof, so we realize them by the same proof polynomial that explicates this J. In
addition, due to the normality condition, all J’s from a negative family have to be
realized by the same proof variable.
Proofs (derivations) of formulas in a Gentzen system, S4JnG in particular, can
be viewed as derivation trees. Nodes are triples: the current sequent, name of the
rule and the principal formulas, and axioms as leaves. It imposes a tree structure
on each family of J’s, with leaves as those nodes where J ’s of a particular family
are ﬁrst introduced (at a leaf of the derivation tree or in a (⇒ ) rule).
Comment: It is not necessary to carry sequents in every node - they can be
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reconstructed from rule names, principle formulas, and full sequents at the root.
Although for the realization algorithm full sequents in every node are needed.
A positive family of J ’s is essential if at least one of its leaves corresponds to a
principal J in a (⇒ ) rule, and is non-essential otherwise.
Realization algorithm:
(by recursion on the derivation tree structure)
In our system S4JnG, there are only three ways of introducing new J-modalities:
• by an axiom;
• inside a formula by which a sequent is ‘weakened’ in a (⇒ ) rule;
• the outer J in the principal formula of a (⇒ ) rule.
Let us enumerate all (⇒ J) rules in the derivation tree and associate provisional
variable ui with the principal J of the i-th rule. All of the provisional variables will
be replaced with proof polynomials by the end of the algorithm.
Stage 1 Every negative family and non-essential family of J’s is realized by a fresh
proof variable. All J ’s from such a family will be realized by a proof variable corre-
sponding to that family.
Stage 2 Pick an essential positive family of J ’s. Enumerate all the occurrences of
(⇒ ) rules that introduce J ’s from this family as the principles: i1 < i2 < . . . < ik.
All such J’s are initially realized by provisional term ui1+ui2+. . . uik , where addition
is associated to the left and ui’s are fresh provisional variables.
We also initialize a substitution σ, which acts on these provisional variables,
to be the empty substitution. At the end of the realization procedure, this substi-
tution will assign a certain proof polynomial to each provisional variable. As a
result, essential positive J’s will also be realized by proof polynomials that contain
no provisional variables.
Next, each S4Jn formula G occurring in the sequent derivation is translated into
an S4nLP formula Gr as follows: each occurrence of J in G is replaced by a proof
polynomial tσ that possibly contains provisional variables, where t is the term real-
izing the family of that J , and σ is the current state of the substitution acting on
provisional variables. This substitution is appended during the realization procedure,
namely, during processing of (⇒ ) rules.
Stage 3 For each sequent in the initial derivation we will construct
• an S4nLP formula C that corresponds to that sequent,
• a proof polynomial t that contains no provisional variables, and
• a Hilbert-style derivation of t : C
recursively on the structure of the derivation tree of ⇒ F .
Kuznets and Brezhnev had the idea to use the polynomials t. They are used
while processing the (⇒ ) rules of the initial S4Jn derivation, and are a vital part
of eliminating exponential blow-up.
N. Novak / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 312 (2015) 143–160148
Base: Let C be a sequent formula. Any sequent formula Γ ⇒ Δ, where Γ =
{A1, . . . , An}, and Δ = {B1, . . . , Bm}, is translated into a formula (. . . (Ar1 ∧ Ar2) ∧
. . .) ∧Arn → (. . . (Br1 ∨Br2) ∨ . . .) ∨Brm .
The antecedent and the consequent of a sequent are multisets, so the order of
formulas is irrelevant in both, but normal Hilbert-style operations do not possess
such freedom. Thus we need to force some order on Ari ’s and on B
r
i ’s, so we can
use any ordering that allows eﬃcient sorting. This ordering should be uniform for
all sequents. This is important for Cook and Reckhow’s idea [9] of implementing
each step of Gentzen-style derivation by several steps of the corresponding Hilbert-
style derivation, otherwise the formulas on diﬀerent branches of the tree might not
match. The lexicographical order is a natural one.
An empty consequent constitutes empty disjunction and is translated as ⊥. An
empty antecedent constitutes empty conjunction and is translated as 	. Therefore
⇒ F is translated as 	 → F r.
Translation of two axioms of S4JnG:
(A) A1, . . . , Ai−1, S, Ai, . . . , An ⇒ B1, . . . , Bj−1, S,Bj , . . . , Bm
is translated as
Ar1 ∧ . . . ∧Ari−1 ∧ S ∧Ari ∧ . . . ∧Arn → Br1 ∨ . . . ∨Brj−1 ∨ S ∨Brj ∨ . . . ∨Brm,
in particular, S ⇒ S is translated as Sr → Sr;
(B) ⊥, A1, . . . , An ⇒ B1, . . . , Bm
is translated as
⊥ ∧Ar1 ∧ . . . ∧Arn → Br1 ∨ . . . ∨Brm;
in particular, ⊥ ⇒ is translated as ⊥ → ⊥.
(Assuming that Ak’s and Bl’s, A
r
k’s and B
r
l ’s are already ordered alphabetically, and
⊥ is the ﬁrst symbol of the alphabet, disjunctions and conjunctions are associated
to the left.)
Each translated implication C of this type is clearly derivable in S4nLP. After
application of the Lifting Lemma to this derivation, we get a ground proof polyno-
mial s and a derivation of s : C.
Induction Step:
Propositional rule with one premise:
Γ ⇒ Δ
Γ′ ⇒ Δ′ .
Let C and C ′ be translations of Γ ⇒ Δ and Γ′ ⇒ Δ′ respectively. By induction
hypothesis, there is a term tC and a derivation lC of tC : C. By propositional
reasoning, there is a derivation of C → C ′. Using the Lifting Lemma, we get a
ground term tR and a derivation lR of tR : (C → C ′). Concatenating lC with lR
and appending the result with the following sequence . . . (derivation lR)
n. tR : (C → C ′)
. . . (derivation lC)
m. tC : C
m+1. tR : (C → C ′) → (tC : C → tR · tC : C ′) (axiom E1)
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m+2. tC : C → tR · tC : C ′ (MP from n and m+1)
m+3. tR · tC : C ′ (MP from m and m+2) ,
we obtain the term tC′ = tR · tC and the derivation lC′ of tR · tC : C ′.
A case of a propositional rule with two premises are handled in a similar way.
Let us consider (⇒) rule for Γ = {B1, . . . , Bn}, and Δ = {D1, . . . , Dm}:
A, JA,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm
JA,B1, . . . , Bn ⇒ D1, . . . , Dm (⇒) .
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the translation of the premise is
C = Br1 ∧ . . . ∧Bri−1 ∧Ar ∧Bri ∧ . . . ∧Brj−1 ∧ x : Ar ∧Brj ∧ . . . ∧Brn → D,
where D = Dr1∨ . . .∨Drm and x is the proof variable associated with the negative
family of the outer J-modality in JA. Then the translation of the conclusion is
C ′ = Br1 ∧ . . . ∧Brj−1 ∧ x : Ar ∧Brj ∧ . . . ∧Brn → D.
Since S4nLP  x : Ar → Ar (reﬂexivity principle E4), it is easy to derive C → C ′.
Then, using the Lifting Lemma, we obtain a ground term t(⇒) and a derivation
l(⇒) of t(⇒) : (C → C ′). The rest is the same as with the one-premise proposi-
tional rules.
The only rule that is treated diﬀerently is (⇒ ), which includes two cases:
(⇒ Ki) and (⇒ J). Let’s consider the ﬁrst one: for Γ = {B1, . . . , Bn}, Δ =
{D1, . . . , Dm} , Σ = {E1, . . . , Eo}, and Π = {A1, . . . , Ar}
JΓ,KiΔ ⇒ A
JΓ,KiΔ,Π ⇒ Σ,KiA (⇒ Ki) .
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the translation of the premise is
C = x : Γr ∧KiΔr → Ar
and x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi are distinct proof variables associated with the
negative families of the outer J-modality in JΓ.
Then the translation of the conclusion is
C ′ = x : Γr ∧KiΔr ∧Πr → Σr ∨KiAr .
By induction hypothesis, we have a term tC and a derivation lC of
tC : (x : Γ
r ∧Ki : Dr → Ar)
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. . . (derivation lC)
n. tC : (x : Γ
r ∧KiΔr → Ar)
n+1.tC : (x : Γ
r ∧KiΔr → Ar) → Ki(x : Γr ∧KiΔr → Ar)(axiom C1)
n+2.Ki(x : Γ
r ∧KiΔr → Ar) (MP from n and n+1)
n+3.Ki(x : Γ
r ∧KiΔr → Ar) → (Ki(x : Γr ∧KiΔr) → KiAr) (axiom B1i)
n+4.Ki(x : Γ
r ∧KiΔr) → KiAr (MP from n+2 and n+3)
n+5.
(∧
Kixj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiKiDrl ) → Ki(x : Γr ∧KiΔr)(simple S4nLP reasoning)
n+6.
(∧
Kixj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiKiDrl ) → KiAr (syllogism from n+4 and n+5)
n+7.xj : B
r
j → Kixj : Brj (an easy S4nLP fact)
n+8.KiD
r
l → KiKiDrl (axiom B3i)
n+9.
(∧
xj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiDrl ) →
(∧
Kixj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiKiDrl )
(propositional reasoning from n+7 and n+8)
n+10.
(∧
xj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiDrl ) → KiAr (syllogism from n+6 and n+9)
n+11.
(∧
xj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiDrl ) ∧Π → Σ ∨KiAr
(propositional reasoning from n+10)
n+12. tn+11 : (
(∧
xj : B
r
j
)
∧ (∧KiDrl ) ∧Π → Σ ∨KiAr)
(Lifting Lemma from n+11).
We obtained the ground term tn+11 and a derivation of tn+11 : (C → C ′). Now,
let us consider the (⇒ J) rule:
for Δ = {D1, . . . , Dm} , Σ = {E1, . . . , Eo}, and Π = {A1, . . . , Ar}
JD1, . . . , JDm ⇒ A
JD1, . . . , JDm, A1, . . . , Ar ⇒ E1, . . . , Eo, JA (⇒ J) .
All J’s in JDi’s are negative and belong to diﬀerent families, so they are realized
by distinct proof variables xi’s. Let k be the number of this (⇒ J) rule and let its
family be realized by us1 + . . . + uk + . . . usl . By induction hypothesis, we have a
term tC and a derivation lC of
tC : (x1 : D
r
1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm → Ar).
By Lemma 2, we construct a term s = s(x1, . . . , xm) and a derivation l1 of
x1 : D
r
1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm → s : (x1 : Dr1 ∧ . . . ∧ xm : Drm).
N. Novak / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 312 (2015) 143–160 151
Note that s does not contain any provisional variables. It is now easy to append
derivations lC and l1 (we’ll use vector notation for conjunction):
. . . (derivation lC)
n. tC : (x : D
r → Ar)
. . . (derivation l1)
m. x : Dr → s : (x : Dr)
m+1.tC : (x : D
r → Ar) → (s : (x : Dr) → tC · s : Ar) (axiom E1)
m+2. s : (x : Dr) → tC · s : Ar (MP from n and m+1)
m+3. x : Dr → tC · s : Ar (syllogism from m and m+2)
. . . (using axiom E3 several times)
k. x : Dr → (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar.
Moreover this derivation is easy to append to obtain derivation l2 of a formula
C ′ that (modulo permutations) looks like
x : Dr ∧A → E ∨ (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar
(here x : Dr and A stand for conjunctions, and E for disjunctions).
We then use the Lifting Lemma to reproduce a ground term tC′ and a derivation
lC′ of
tC′ : (x : D
r ∧A → E ∨ (us1σ + . . .+ tC · s+ . . . uslσ) : Ar) .
While lifting l2 [5], there is no need to lift its initial part lC since the only formula
we use for the second part is tC : (x : D
r → Ar); this formula is easily lifted by
adding to lC the following two formulas:
tC : (x : D
r → Ar) →!tC : tC : (x : Dr → Ar), and
!tC : tC : (x : D
r → Ar),
the latter being the desired lifted version. This procedure produces a ground
term because tC is ground. Also, this modiﬁcation renders the whole procedure
polynomial in the size of the original S4Jn-derivation. In the original algorithm [2],
each time a (⇒ ) rule is processed, most formulas in the initial derivation are
replaced by three formulas in the lifted one, which leads to exponential growth
in the number of (⇒ ) rules. We then append σ by a new substitution: σ =
σ + {uk ← tC · s}, and apply this substitution throughout the derivation (S4nLP is
known to be closed under substitutions). After that, there are no occurrences of uk
remaining in the derivation. As a result, we eliminated one provisional variable.
Final Touch: At the end of the procedure, the entire derivation tree of ⇒ F
is translated – all (⇒ ) rules have been processed and there are no provisional
variables remaining. Thus, F r is simply an S4nLP formula. Moreover, we have a
Hilbert-style derivation lt of t : (	 → F r) for some ground term t. To acquire F r,
we do the following:
. . . (derivation lt)
n. t : (	 → F r)
n+1. t : (	 → F r) → (	 → F r) (axiom E4)
n+2. (	 → F r) (MP from n and n+1)
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n+3. 	
n+4. F r (MP from n+2 and n+3).
1.5 Notes on implementation
The procedure was implemented in OCaml. Evaluation of box families, considered
to be trivial on paper, was the biggest hurdle. Each box was assigned a unique
family identiﬁer. Proofs have branches, and families grow by transitive extension,
thus the disjoint set of sets (families) of box identiﬁers that are related (belong to
the same family) needs to be maintained. What actually occurs is that each box is
replaced with Pr(Provisional, F ) where Provisional is this unique identiﬁer. The
algorithm recursively walks over the proof tree, assigns these identiﬁers, and collects
information about which identiﬁers fall into which family. At each step representing
application of a rule, we have to track how each formula above the line (of the rule)
was transformed and then transform the formulas below the line accordingly.
For all classical reasoning that justiﬁes a shift from rule assumptions to rule
conclusion, we say that there is a (fresh) proof constant justifying the implication,
and deduce such implications using the reﬂexivity axiom t : A → A.
At some point, we realized that the produced proofs were way too long, both
in the number of steps and the length of produced formulas. We partially address
both.
First of all, as suggested by Melvin Fitting, we introduced two one-step rules:
Deduction and Lifting. After each application of the Lifting lemma or Deduction
Theorem, we retain the full chain of reasoning for validation purposes, but collapse
them for purposes of display. Therefore, one sees the following:
k. A1, . . . , Am, . . . , An  B
k + 1. Am+1, . . . , An  Am → . . . → A1 → B (by Deduction)
and
k. x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An  B
k + 1. x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An  c(x1, . . . , xn) : B (by Lifting).
Second, we assigned fresh (shortcut) constants to each proof term appearing in
the proof and with length more than 5. We list these assignments at the end of
the proof and provide a hyperlink from each occurrence of such a constant to its
deﬁnition.
We also inserted dummy steps to mark the boundaries between individual Gentzen
proof steps and certain stages of⇒  rule realization. Such dummy steps are labeled
with Gentzen rules or realization stage names instead of Hilbert rules or axioms.
These dummy rules are also rendered with normal font size, and all intermediate
steps with a smaller font.
This implementation was connected with the automatic prover for multi-agent
logic with justiﬁed knowledge S4Jn in the MetaPRL logical framework [6; 7]. The
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output of the S4Jn prover is a Gentzen-style cut-free proof, exactly what polynomial
realization procedures need.
2 Experiments
The realization procedure was ran on several simple examples, as well as on several
classical puzzles: the Wise Girls puzzle and the Wise Men Puzzle [16], which we
will not cover in this article.
We present here the Muddy Children Puzzle and Surprise Examination paradox.
2.1 Graphs
Some of the experiments are accompanied with the three types of graphs.
The ﬁrst graph shows the growth of the number of steps in a Hilbert-style proof
as a function of the number of steps in the original Gentzen-style proof. According
to [5] we should observe O(n2) - dependency on this graph.
The second graph shows the growth of the total length of all formulas in a
Hilbert-style proof as a function of the total length of all formulas in the original
Gentzen-style proof. According to [5] we should observe O(n6) - dependency on
this graph.
And the last graph shows the growth of the external (outer) terms’ sizes in a
Hilbert-style proof as a function of the number of steps in the original Gentzen-style
proof. According to [5] we should observe O(n2) - dependency on this graph.
One can see the bumps on the graphs. The bumps are the result of (⇒ )
rule realization. We observe that all other rules are linear in the number of steps.
Therefore, it is possible that O(n6) bound can be improved by counting “expensive”
and “inexpensive” rules separately.
2.2 Realization of the Muddy Children Puzzle
N children are playing together [10]. Their mother tells them that if they get dirty,
there will be severe consequences. Now it so happens that during their play, some
of the children, say k of them, get mud on their foreheads. Each can see mud on the
others, but not on his own forehead, so no one says anything. Along comes their
father who says, “At least one of you has mud on your forehead,” thus expressing
a fact known to each of them before he speaks (if k > 1). The father then asks the
following question repeatedly: “Do any of you know whether or not you have mud
on your own forehead?” Assuming that the children are all perceptive, intelligent,
truthful, and that they answer simultaneously, what will happen? There is a ‘proof’
that the ﬁrst k − 1 times he asks the question, they will all answer “No,” but the
kth time, the children with muddy foreheads will all answer “Yes.”
For this puzzle, a straightforward epistemic logic formalization can lead to in-
consistent sets of hypotheses [7; 11; 12]. For example, let c1, . . . , cn be propositional
variables reserved for N children, where ci encodes that i
th child is muddy. J stand
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for “it is a common knowledge”, and kw i a stand for “i knows whether a or ¬a”.
Then, the set of formulae
J(c1 ∨ c2 ∨ . . . ∨ cn), J(kw i Cj) for all i = j, J¬(kw i Ci) for all i,
is inconsistent for all n ≥ 2.
For the sake of observing the complexity of the realization process, one can ﬁnd
the complexities of this contradictory formalization for ﬁve children in the following
graphs.
In [14] a version of logic similar to S4Jn was used, with all modalities graded by
time, to present a model-based solution of Muddy Children. This solution has a
model, hence it avoids introduction of a contradiction. For reference, it is presented
it the Appendix of [16].
Here we present three of the possible formalizations of the Muddy Children puz-
zle for three children, using McCarthy’s idea. Graphs for each complexity measure
are given after the last formalization, we merged them for ease of comparison.
We use the following notation:
• K-modality has two indices now: time and agent, i.e. Kt,aA stands for “At time
t, agent a knows A.”
• EtA ::= Kt,a1A ∧ . . . ∧Kt,anA stands for “Everybody knows A at time t.”
• kwt,a A ::= Kt,aA∨Kt,a¬A, i.e. “At the moment t agent a knows whether or not
A holds.”
We use McCarthy’s idea only, not his system. We stay in S4Jn, no new axioms or
rules related to time are introduced, and Kt,a is just syntactic sugar for K(t−1)n+a,
where n is the number of agents.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the ﬁrst and third children are
dirty, and the second one is clean, i.e., c1,¬c2, c3.
(A) Longer version
Denotations: Child 1 stands for the ﬁrst child, etc.
Hypotheses: (denotation: wmn stands for ‘were/was muddy or not’)
(1) c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ c3
(2) kw3,2 c1; at moment 3, Child 2 knows if Child 1 is muddy or not
(3) kw3,2 c3; at moment 3, Child 2 knows if Child 3 is muddy or not
(4) kw3,2 (kw2,1 c1); at moment 3, Child 2 knows if Child 1 at moment 2 knew he wmn
(5) K3,2( at moment 3, the second child knows that
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(6) (kw2,1 c3) ∧ (kw2,1 c2)∧ at moment 2, Child 1 knew if Child 2 and Child 3 wmn, and
(7) K2,1( at moment 2, Child 1 knows that
(8) ¬(kw1,1 c1)∧ ¬(kw1,2 c2)∧ ¬(kw1,3 c3)∧ at the 1st moment, nobody knew if they
wmn, and
(9) (E1(c1 ∨ c2 ∨ c3))∧ at 1st moment, everybody knew that at least one of them was
muddy, and
(10) (kw1,1 c2) ∧ (kw1,1 c3)∧ at 1st moment, Child 1 knew if Child 2 and Child 3 wmn,
and
(11) (kw1,2 c1) ∧ (kw1,2 c3)∧ at 1st moment, Child 2 knew if Child 1 and Child 3 wmn,
and
(12) (kw1,3 c1)∧ (kw1,3 c2) )) at 1st moment, Child 3 knew if Child 1 and Child 2 wmn
(13) K3,2((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3) → ¬ kw2,1 c1) at moment 3, Child 2 knows that if all of them are
dirty, Child 1 at moment 2 did not know if he was muddy or not
Conclusion: kw3,2 c2 at moment 3, Child 2 knew if he was muddy or not
The last hypothesis cannot be relaxed because in situations where a child
says that (s)he does not know if (s)he is muddy, (s)he cannot really derive it in
S4Jn. So when the system performs case analysis, we have to help it with such
implications.
(B) A short version:
If we make the second, third, and fourth premises stronger, we then obtain
a shorter version:
Hypotheses:
(1) c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ c3
(2) K3,2 c1
(3) K3,2 c3
(4) K3,2 (K2,1c1)
(5) K3,2 ((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3) → ¬kw2,1 c1)
Conclusion: kw3,2 c2 .
(C) A short version with J:
We would like to see some modalities realized as proof terms so we replaced
all modalities that represent facts that everyone knows (due to public an-
nouncements or general conditions of the puzzle) with J. We also strengthen
the conclusion to state that at the third moment, everyone knows that everyone
knows about themselves, so we have to add lines (6), (7) to bring the knowledge
of the ﬁrst and third children from step 2 to step 3, and we add (9) to reﬂect
the fact that if the second child learns about himself, he will announce it. We
did not perform this transformation with the longer version because the prover
was overwhelmed by the complexity.
Hypotheses:
(1) c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ c3
(2) J(kw3,2 c1)
(3) J(kw3,2 c3)
(4) J(K2,1 c1)
(5) J(K2,3 c3)
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(6) J(K2,1c1 → K3,1c1)
(7) J(K2,3c3 → K3,3c3)
(8) J((c1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3) → ¬(kw2,1 c1))
(9) J(K3,2c2 → J(K3,2 c2))
Conclusion: J(K3,2¬c2 ∧K3,1c1 ∧K3,3c3).
Here are the graphs for all three cases:
2.3 Formalization of the Surprise Examination Paradox
There is a famous epistemic Surprise Examination Paradox (SEP): A professor tells
students in his class that there will be a surprise in-class exam during the next
week. There are 5 weekdays and class meets every day. Can the professor give
an exam? We assume that professor and students are truthful and smart. By the
usual backward induction argument, students ﬁgure that the exam cannot be given
at all. Indeed, the exam cannot be given on the last day, since it would not be a
surprise. Therefore, the exam cannot be given the day before, etc. The paradox
occurs when the professor gives an exam on day two, and it is a complete surprise
for the students!
The are 12 pages of references on the subject in [8], and it was not our goal to
become experts in this area. Here is a naive, straightforward formalization of SEP
conditions: consider a very trustful student who, despite his or her intelligence, is
very confused on the last day if the test has not yet happened. He/she “knows”
that the professor never lies or makes mistakes, and at the same time it seems that
there is no alternative option and the exam has to happen on this last day. Any
certain answer, positive or negative, to the question “Do you think that the test will
be given today?” will lead to a contradiction. Therefore, the natural answer is “I
do not know,” which implies (just as a negative answer) that the student considers
the possibility that there will be no test. This implicit additional outcome resolves
the paradox.
In the formalization below we take a conservative approach and simply prove
that full set of assumptions is contradictory or that the exam cannot happen on
the last day of the week. We use diﬀerent agent indices to represent diﬀerent times
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and diﬀerent students, if needed. Knowledge relation between diﬀerent moments of
time for the same student have to be explicitly stated for individual formulae, as
S4Jn has no built-in support for time.
di stands for “the exam took place on ith day.” For the case of one student, KiA
means that the student will know A just before day i. With this setup, K1 has a
somewhat special meaning because it describes what we know up front about this
puzzle.
2.3.1 2-day week
1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2)) 2. K1(K2d1 ∨ K2¬d1) 3. K1¬K2d2 4. ¬K1d1
⊥
The ﬁrst assumption states that the exam will happen on either of the days. The
second assumption states that after the ﬁrst day, it will be known if the exam took
place already. The third assumption is eﬀectively our formalization of “surprise” -
prior to the second day, we will not know if the exam will happen on second day.
And the last assumption is also “surprise”, this time, for the ﬁrst day. MetaPRL
ﬁnds a proof for this theorem in a few seconds.
2.3.2 2-day week, many students
The same problem with 2 students is formulated trivially by duplicating relevant
formulas and replacing modality indices:
1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2)) 5. K3(K4d1 ∨ K4¬d1)
2. K1(K2d1 ∨ K2¬d1) 6. K3¬K4d2
3. K1¬K2d2 7. ¬K3d1
4. ¬K1d1
⊥
Extending this theorem for 40 students has some, but little eﬀect on proof search
timing, still keeping it under one second; it seems to be linear or polynomial of low
degree. This is expected, as conclusion of the theorem is independent of the number
of students, and the ﬁrst 4 assumptions are suﬃcient anyway.
2.3.3 3-day week
The ﬁrst assumption states that exam will happen on either of the days. The 2nd,
3rd, and 4th assumptions say that we know the results of the previous days. The
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5th to 8th assumptions are “surprise” conditions.
1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d3) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2 ∧ ¬d3) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ d3)) 5. K1¬K2d2
2. J(K2d1 ∨ K2¬d1) 6. K1¬K3d3
3. J(K3d1 ∨ K3¬d1) 7. K2¬K3d3
4. J(K3d2 ∨ K3¬d2) 8. ¬K1d1
¬d3
Note that this theorem only states the impossibility of the exam on the last day of
the week and does not involve backward induction. So this is a simpliﬁed version,
basically the ﬁrst step in establishing the paradox.
If we unfold all disjunctions, MetaPRL has no problems completing the proof.
But it was unable to ﬁnd the proof in fully automatic mode in an hour. In this
sense, this theorem is harder than Muddy Children puzzle for 4 children, which
can be solved in 150-250 seconds. The reason why fully automatic mode fails is
because all J-boxed assumptions have to be used twice in the reasoning and the
prover works by ﬁrst exhausting all proof matrices with modalities used at most
once, then expanding the search space by allowing each modality to have two preﬁx
interpretations; the resulting search space is big and the solution does not appear
quickly. The Muddy Children puzzle also needs this search space expansion, but
we get luckier there, although it is not clear exactly why.
The Muddy Children puzzle for 4 children can be sped up by an order of magni-
tude by manually duplicating assumptions that will be used twice in the reasoning
and avoiding automatic expansion of all modalities. We tried to apply the same
technique to our problem at hand but it produced too big of a search space for the
prover, and the search simply did not ﬁnish within a reasonable time.
This straightforward formalization of SEP results in contradiction as expected.
For more on SEP see [13].
3 Conclusion
Following [5] and [4], a polynomial realization algorithm for S4nLP was implemented
in MetaPRL Logical Framework and connected with S4Jn prover [7]. This procedure
was run on several interesting examples. Realization algorithm performed better
than expected, the bottleneck was always on the S4Jn prover’s side. On the other
hand, even small S4Jn Gentzen-style proofs result in long S4nLP Hilbert-style proofs
which are beyond human comprehension.
Though we abbreviate certain trivial segments of a proof, the result is too long
to be readable. Therefore the instructive parts are the length of the resulting proof,
the length of the outer term as functions of an incoming proof, and the realized
formula itself.
The algorithm has been known for more than a decade, but this work is a ﬁrst
time it was applied to proofs longer than just few steps. We used famous Muddy
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Children Puzzle and Surprise Exam Paradox for our experiments.
4 Future Work
Considering the complications that were met, it seems instrumental to modify or ex-
tend the current implementation of S4nLP realizer to accept interactively/manually
constructed proofs. This will allow to evaluate realization procedure performance
on SEP for three and more days.
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